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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COUNTRIES CANNOT PAY THEIR BANK
LOANS? THE RENEGOTIATION PROCESS

Jack GUTENTAG and Richard HERRING

*

1. Introduction
Over the last decade the external debt of developing countries has increased
substantially. The increase in debt has led to increased strains in their capacity
to service debt when assessed by measures of their cash flow position in foreign
exchange, such as the debt-service ratio (see table 1). Whether threats to their
solvency are serious is a disputable issue, but there is no question regarding the
seriousness of their liquidity problems. Since 1977 at least 15 developing
countries have attempted to renegotiate their debts with international banks:
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Gabon, Jamaica, Liberia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Peru,
Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sudan, Turkey, and Zaire. An increasing number
of countries are experiencing debt servicing difficulties and amounts in arrears
are cumulating. Most recently, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the developing
countries with the largest debts to international banks, have experienced debt
crises.
The increase in the proportion of debt owed to commercial banks (see table
2) has aggravated the debt servicing burden of developing countries because
debt to commercial banks is usually contracted at higher interest rates and
shorter maturities than debt to official creditors. Moreover, the growth of
lending by commercial banks has added to the difficulty of resolving debt
servicing problems once they occur because it has vastly increased the number
of participants whose interests must be represented in any negotiations for
resolving the borrower's difficulties. Thus, this growth of bank lending has
increased the likelihood of debt crises and complicated their resolution.
• An earlier version of this paper, prepared for the National Science Foundation, was completed
in February 1982, before the payment difficulties in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil had broken
the surface. Since the manner in which these serious problems arose was largely consistent with
the inferences drawn from the original analysis, no attempt was made to revise the analysis to

reflect these developments. The authors would like to thank David Dod at the Federal Reserve
Board, and Charles Coltman, III and Richard Emigh at Philadelphia National Bank for helpful
comments on the earlier draft. Of course, the authors alone are responsible for any remaining
errors.
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The renegotiation process begins when the borrower admits an inability to
meet the terms of existing loan contracts and requests the forbearance of
lenders. Prior to and during the renegotiation process arrears may cumulate,
the lenders may threaten to declare the borrower in default, and the borrower
may threaten to repudiate his debts, but the usual outcome of the renegotiation
process is a rescheduling, a refinancing, or both. "Rescheduling" refers to a
stretching out of principal repayments falling due within a specified interval,
usually at a higher interest rate, often with a grace period during which no
amortization payments are scheduled. On occasion, interest payments may also
be rescheduled, in which case the postponed interest payments are added to the
principal due at a later date. Normally the borrower will be required to pay a
new fee and a higher spread over the base interest rate. In contrast, "refinancing" involves the issuance of a new loan to repay all the principal on various
outstanding loans rather than just the amounts falling due over a specified
interval. Some refinancings, which we shall term "market" refinancings, however, are not part of the renegotiation process but are initiated by the borrower
in order to stretch out maturities, or to take advantage of an easing of market
terms or an improvement in the market's evaluation of the borrower's creditworthiness. New lenders are usually involved in a market refinancing, but not
in a refinancing that is part of the renegotiation process. Refinancings that are
an outcome of a renegotiation process are made with the same group of lenders
and typically involve a hardening of terms relative to the existing loan
agreements.
Existing renegotiation procedures for dealing with the debt servicing problems of sovereign borrowers are ad hoc and growing concerns exist about their
adequacy. In its recent opinion survey of international banks, the Group of
Thirty [1] notes that more than half the respondents "... are unsure whether
existing rescheduling arrangements are satisfactory and nearly 20% believe
they are not". Before considering proposals for reform, however, it is important to understand how and why the current procedures have evolved. We
begin with an analysis of the credit relationship with emphasis on the crucial
role of uncertainty. We show why some of the traditional ways of limiting
uncertainty in domestic transactions are ineffective in controlling risks in
international transactions. This ineffectiveness, in turn, leads banks to rely
more heavily on a short-leash approach to international lending, whereby loan
maturities are kept short. Our analysis enables us to explain several characteristics of the current procedures and to identify some weaknesses. We conclude
with an assessment of proposals to reform current procedures.
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2. The credit relationship
2.1. Creditorprotection techniques in domestic credit transactions
Uncertainty is a fundamental feature of most credit relationships. The
creditor's advance of funds today in exchange for the borrower's promise of
repayment in the future is subject to two sorts of uncertainty: (1) whether the
borrower will be able to repay (economic hazard) and (2) whether the borrower
will be willing to repay and to honor the other terms of the loan agreement
(moral hazard). Within a country (especially within a developed country such
as the United States), assessment of the ability of borrowers to repay is
facilitated by easy access to information and familiarity with the economy and
the culture. Such assessments usually are more expensive and less reliable in
lending to foreign borrowers, although lenders can compensate by exercising
greater care in selecting borrowers.
Moral hazard may arise in many ways ranging from actions taken by the
borrower that might adversely affect his future capacity to service debt, to
outright debt repudiation. Moral hazard is controlled domestically by the
availability of information on "character", in some cases by cultural constraints on defaults, and most important, by the use of collateral, restrictive
covenants, and contractual penalties backed up by the enforcement powers of
the state. These means of controlling moral hazard are generally ineffective in
international lending.
When borrowers and lenders are residents of the same country, the enforcement powers of the state are usually available to protect creditors against loss,
while also protecting debtors against unreasonable demands of creditors. Most
nations have developed procedures for determining whether a borrower can
and should be compelled to repay and whether the borrower's assets should be
liquidated or retained, for consolidating claims of all creditors, and for
distributing the borrower's assets among the creditors. Sometimes the process
may involve a forgiveness of some part of the borrower's debt and/or a
stretching out of the maturity of his obligations.
The consolidation of claims against the debtor yields substantial efficiency
benefits for both debtors and creditors. Without consolidation each creditor
would have to make a separate solvency determination and attempt to attach
the borrower's assets before other creditors. Simultaneous creditor actions
would impose costs on all parties, including the debtor. Moreover, consolidation gives rise to economies in administrative and transactions costs and
provides greater assurance of equal treatment to creditors. Bankruptcy procedures may also benefit creditors by allowing for a continuation of the debtor's
business under court supervision in cases where the business is worth more
alive than dead.
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2.2. Limited efficacy of the standardtechniques in internationallending
When the credit relationship extends across national boundaries, the dangers
of moral hazard multiply. The power of the creditor's government to compel
foreign borrowers to abide by the terms of the loan contract ordinarily is very
limited. Even if the power exists, it is very seldom that the creditor's government, other interested governments, or international organizations can be
induced to impose sanctions on the borrower on behalf of a private creditor.
Bankruptcy procedures in the creditor's home country, furthermore, are
usually of no assistance when debtors are in a foreign jurisdiction. The
creditors may be able to attach any of the debtor's assets that are held outside
of the debtor's country, but the bulk of these assets are usually within the
debtor's country and, therefore, probably outside the legal reach of the
creditor. This is especially likely if the government is either the debtor or has
guaranteed the debt, an arrangement which is quite common today with loans
to many developing countries. Even where transactions are strictly private, the
debtor's government will be involved if the debtor's problems are connected in
any way with the availability of foreign exchange. The problems considered in
this article thus apply whenever the foreign government is either the borrower,
the guarantor, or controls the supply of foreign exchange available for servicing foreign debts. The risk that debt service payments will be delayed, reduced
or renounced due to the exercise of sovereign power in the borrowing country
is sometimes termed "transfer risk".
2.3. Creditorprotection techniques in internationalcredit transactions
2.3.1. The threat of withholding credit and legal harassment
Cross-border lenders are not without means to punish borrowers who do
not pay. Where lenders are governments, the willingness of sovereign borrowers to repay is affected by political factors, including implicit or explicit
sanctions by the lending sovereigns or withholding of other benefits. Private
lenders can attempt to compel the sovereign to repay by threatening to
withhold further credit and/or by threatening perpetual legal harassment that
would wholly or partly shut the sovereign out of the world trading system.
Such power has worked remarkably well in the period since World War II.
With the partial exception of Cuba, Ghana (briefly), and North Korea, no
government has repudiated its debts. This has proven true even in instances
where the threat to withhold further credit would seem to have limited power.
For example, countries that have borrowed largely to service past debt have
continued to honor those debts. Intensely nationalist new regimes that regarded foreign banks as collaborators of reviled predecessor governments,
nevertheless have continued to service the debts contracted by those governments. Countries with such limited development prospects that they are
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unlikely to get substantial new loans even if they repay promptly continue to
service their debts.
On close inspection, the threat to constrain the sovereign's ability to run
current account deficits by withdrawing credit is less potent than the threat to
deny participation in the Western trading system. Even if a country does not
expect to be in a debtor position with regard to foreign banks, the country may
nevertheless find it essential to have balances at foreign banks in order to
finance trade flows, and any such balances are subject to attachment by
creditors. Thus, depriving a borrower of access to international banking
facilities is tantamount to depriving that borrower of participation in the
international financial system. Without access to international deposit and
credit facilities a sovereign is reduced to international barter or a shift to the
COMECOM trading system.
It should be noted that the effectiveness of these sanctions depends on the
degree of coordination between commercial banks and their governments so
that, at the extreme, the recalcitrant debtor will neither obtain fresh credits nor
have access to foreign balances to make payments. The likelihood of a
common front is enhanced by the natural tendency to distrust the promises of
any borrower who has failed to keep his promises in the past and by two
institutional characteristics. First, banks generally organize international syndicates, at least in part, so that the borrower's failure to repay will alienate banks
(and, it is hoped, governments where such banks are headquartered) in several
different countries, and so that the repayment prospects for the loan are not
entirely dependent on the maintenance of good relations between the borrower
and any one country. In addition, cross-default clauses make it difficult for the
borrower to engage in selective defaults.
The risks of moral hazard in sovereign lending by commercial banks remain
very serious. First, as international banking becomes increasingly competitive,
the united front necessary to deny debtors who have repudiated access to
international banking facilities could easily break down. The Iranian experience showed that cross-default clauses are not automatically invoked. Furthermore, it is not difficult to imagine that some banks could perceive attractive
profit opportunities in dealing with a country that is shunned by other banks
but has shed its foreign debt, and that the lending bank's government might
have such an overriding interest in the borrowing country that it would not
permit the borrower's assets to be attached.
Although no important borrowing countries have attempted to repudiate
their debt, this does not necessarily mean that they will not do so in the future.
The benefits of repudiation depend on the burden of debt. If this burden keeps
rising, the temptation to repudiate will likewise increase.
Finally, even if outright repudiation can be avoided, banks have very
limited means of protecting themselves against less extreme forms of moral
hazard. For example, sovereign debtors can jeopardize the creditor's chance for
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repayment by incurring large additional debts or by pursuing policies that are
inconsistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium. Often the policies of
sovereign debtors that are politically most attractive are the very ones that
endanger their capacity to repay their froreign loans. In contrast, the policies
that the sovereign's creditors prefer would endanger the tenure of the existing
government. Governments faced with a choice between jeopardizing their
future capacity to repay foreign debt and immediately endangering their own
tenure in office will usually opt for the former.
2.3.2. Keeping maturitiesshort
Loans subject to transfer risk [2] are made with the implicit assumption that
macroeconomic policy will be effectively managed so that the country will have
sufficient foreign exchange to service its debts. Although this assumption has,
on occasion, been made an explicit part of the loan agreement, it is almost
always left unstated. There is little point in drawing up restrictive covenants on
a borrowing country's macroeconomic policy, since commercial banks are in
no position to enforce such covenants, and the explicit statement of such
conditions is likely to be viewed as an offensive intrusion on the borrower's
economic sovereignty.
Instead of imposing restrictive covenants, banks attempt to influence the
borrower's macroeconomic policies by requiring the sovereign to renegotiate
his debt at short intervals [3]. This is the essence of the short-leash approach.
Limiting the maturity of a loan is a traditional way of limiting risks. To the
extent that the creditor can forecast the near term more confidently than the
long term, a short maturity limits his exposure to economic hazards. The
shorter the period, the less the probability that an adverse development will
occur. In international lending the short-leash approach is even more important as a means of limiting the creditor's exposure to moral hazard especially the risk that actions by the sovereign debtor after the loan is drawn
down will injure future capacity to repay. Sovereign borrowers will be inhibited from taking such actions if they must renegotiate the loan after the
creditor has observed their behavior and before they have reaped full advantage from their action. As Citibank notes in its 1981 Annual Report:
"... country risk from foreign currency lending is reduced as the length of the
obligation decreases, since shorter maturities permit adjustments in exposure
as balance of payments or political conditions change".
The short-leash approach, however, has consequences that weaken the
international banking system. First, the short-leash strategy may lead to false
confidence and make some creditors feel safer than they actually are. The
approach is subject to the fallacy of composition: an effective risk-control
device for one creditor may prove to be ineffective if all creditors try to
withdraw their loans at once. Banks typically fail to take the actions of other
banks into account because most banks believe they have better information
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than other banks, and short maturities do protect any creditor with superior
information who can run before other creditors perceive that the situation has
changed. Not all banks can be correct in this perception, however, and the
false security of at least some makes the overall credit relationship more
vulnerable to crisis.
Second, under the short-leash approach, debt repayment schedules are
related less to the capacity of the borrower to repay than to the need to
influence the borro-wer's willingness to repay. Loan maturities tend to be
shorter than those that are optimal from the standpoint of repayment capacity.
A third consequence of the short-leash approach, as discussed below, is that
debt crises become more difficult to resolve once they do occur.

3. Risk management and debt crises
Current procedures for resolving debt servicing problems between sovereign
debtors and commercial banks are ad hoc and unsatisfactory in many respects.
3.1. Developing a common position among banks
Several factors make it difficult for banks faced with a major sovereign debt
repayment problem to develop a common bargaining strategy. This can lead to
substantial delays in dealing with these problems, and contributes to uncertainty about the outcome.
The large number of banks involved may itself be a major difficulty. Recent
negotiations with Turkey, Poland, Romania, and Mexico have each involved
several hundred banks and it has taken a substantial amount of time even to
identify the banks involved. This problem may be mitigated somewhat in
practice because the more heavily exposed banks carry the most weight in
renegotiations. For example, in early 1982 Romania reached an agreement
with its nine most heavily exposed creditors which was then imposed on 200
other Western banks, the outrage of those banks notwithstanding [4]. On the
surface it might appear that banks with relatively small exposure to the
troubled debtor could exercise significant leverage because they could write off
their share of the country's debt and therefore might be able to make a credible
threat to declare a default. In practice this threat has proven to be ineffective,
largely because of sanctions that the more heavily exposed banks could apply
against renegade banks in interbank markets and because the more heavily
exposed banks could strike a deal with the borrower that would leave the
renegade banks with nothing.
Furthermore, the predisposition of banks is to behave competitively. Although they may form transitory coalitions to participate in syndicated loans,
each bank is pursuing its own objectives. Indeed, the short-leash approach
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implicitly relies on the assumption that each bank can detect a pending debt
servicing problem before its competitors and, in effect, shed its exposure on
other banks. Moreover, competitiveness is in itself a substantial obstacle to
refinancing the borrower's outstanding obligations because no bank, whether it
be an official creditor, a grantor of aid, or an international agency, wishes to
be cast in the position of bailing out banks who withdraw their credit lines.
3.2. Debt crises and balance-of-payments crises
The short-leash strategy increases the likelihood that a balance-of-payments
crisis will lead to a debt crisis. A balance-of-payments crisis may be defined as
a current account deficit of such magnitude that it requires a sharp shift in
government policies to restore equilibrium [5]. Not all balance-of-payments
crises lead to an interruption in debt service payments because by shifting its
policies appropriately, a government may maintain its credit-worthiness, as
Brazil did in late 1980.
Unfortunately, the requisite shift in policy will almost always be quite
painful, both economically and politically. In order to reduce the current
account deficit, the government must usually reduce aggregate demand relative
to output; the more pleasant option of increasing output relative to aggregate
demand is seldom feasible, especially within a short time span. Thus, the
requisite policy shifts are almost always restrictive. It is not surprising that
governments frequently resist adjustment pressures. The price of resistance,
however, is likely to be a debt crisis: a situation where the government cannot
roll over its external debt. When a government's policies do not sustain the
confidence of creditors, foreign creditors will not roll over their claims,
domestic residents may shift funds abroad, and the impact of the current
account deficit on foreign exchange reserves is exacerbated by net capital
outflows.
A current account deficit arising from any source that is accompanied by an
adverse shift in expectations regarding the government's policies can thus lead
to a "run", an unwillingness of holders of maturing obligations to roll them
over. The larger the volume of such obligations coming due in any period, the
larger the magnitude of any potential run. Thus, the more "conservative"
banks are in protecting themselves individually against moral hazard by
keeping maturities short, the more likely that a balance-of-payments deficit
(which in some cases might be correctable in time if capital outflows could be
avoided) will lead to a debt crisis.
3.3. Debt crises and initiation of renegotiations
Banks are unwilling to enter into debt renegotiations until a debt crisis
occurs, because they would prefer that the country respond to market pressures
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to change its policies and because they would rather have a country refinance
its maturing obligations than renegotiate them.
Banks prefer a market refinancing to renegotiation for several reasons.
(1) An orderly refinancing enables the borrower to honor the terms of the
loan agreement. Banks sometimes stress that this helps sustain the creditworthiness of the borrower, but it is also helpful in maintaining confidence in
banks. A failure to achieve an orderly refinancing raises questions about the
efficacy of market mechanisms for influencing the borrower's policies and,
therefore, casts doubt on the value of the bank's claims on the borrower.
(2) The informal bargaining between a country and the impersonal market
that occurs in a market refinancing avoids the explicit and awkward intrusion
on the economic sovereignty of the borrower that arises in debt renegotiations.
(3) A refinancing generates new fees for participating banks, whereas a
renegotiation entails substantial transactions costs and managerial time because of heightened uncertainty [6].
Market refinancings are not always an adequate substitute for formal debt
renegotiations, however. There may be a greater probability that the borrower's
adjustment program will fail because the bargaining over the borrower's
policies is less explicit, the information base is less complete, and there is no
effective mechanism for monitoring the performance of the country. If the
program fails, the consequent debt renegotiation will be even more complicated than if it had been conducted earlier. Amounts to be rescheduled will
have increased, as will the burden of balance-of-payments adjustment. (This
seems particularly true of the refinancing of the Peruvian external debt in
1976, the refinancings of the Polish debt over the last part of the seventies, and
the Mexican debt crisis in 1982.)
The refinancing option may present another problem in the extreme case of
a country with such enormous indebtedness to banks that its failure to service
its debts could jeopardize the solvency of several of its bank creditors. In this
case, the banks will have lost all power to influence the borrower's policies, and
the refinancing may be little more than an attempt to obscure the borrower's
difficulties. In addition to the misallocation of financial resources, this situation is particularly threatening to the stability of the banking system. Heavily
exposed banks will take on even larger exposures (a) as banks that could afford
to write off the loan decline to roll over their claims on the troubled country,
and (b) as claims of increasingly doubtful value become more concentrated in
banks that were already overexposed. We have probably not yet observed such
an instance, but banks and bank supervisors must be aware of the risk.
3.4. Absence of a forgiveness option
In dealing with domestic firms that are having debt servicing difficulties,
banks may agree to forgive a portion of the firm's debt if this is necessary for
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its continuance and if continuance of the firm would yield the bank a higher
return than its liquidation. Although countries are not liquidated, it is conceivable that renegotiations that include forgiveness of sovereign debt would
yield a higher return than renegotiation without forgiveness. Vulnerability to
moral hazard, however, makes banks resistant to proposals to forgive sovereign
debt. Although in principle it might seem desirable to treat debt servicing
problems differently when they are due to exogenous factors than when they
are due to factors that should have been under the borrower's control, in
practice the distinction is difficult to draw. A policy of forgiving debt when the
cause of a debt crisis is some factor beyond a country's control might reduce
the government's incentives for dealing with the problem as effectively as
possible. Moreover, if foregiveness were to become a standard option, spreads
would rise to provide creditors with ex ante compensation for such expected
losses.
3.5. Shortness of consolidationperiod
Banks prefer short consolidation periods even when it is clear that the
debtor's problems will extend beyond the period. This is another reflection of
the short-leash approach to managing uncertainty. The necessity for conducting repeated renegotiations with a debtor is part of the creditor's means of
limiting moral hazard, providing greater assurances that the debtor will not use
his freedom from the burden of debt service payments to pursue grandiose and
wasteful policies, and avoid balance-of-payments adjustment. The short-leash
approach also may aim to make debt relief as irksome as possible in order to
deter the borrower and others from seeking debt relief. The short-leash
approach imposes significant costs on the debtor, however. The debtor's
uncertainty about the availability of financial resources may inhibit the formulation of long-term plans and retard the return to sustainable economic growth.
Short-term palliatives may be favored over long-term structural change. Moreover, the necessity of repeatedly renegotiating debts may divert scarce
managerial and professional talent from more productive activities. A less
intrusive method of controlling moral hazard could better the situation of both
creditors and debtors. To some extent, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) serves this function.
3.6. Commercial banks and the IMP
A debt crisis represents a failure in the ability of banks to influence the
macroeconomic policies of the borrower. As a consequence banks usually insist
on external supervision of the debtor country's policies. This role is usually
assumed by the IMF, particularly because the Fund may already have entered
into negotiation with the counry regarding its balance-of-payments crisis. If the
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borrower has not already concluded a standby agreement with the Fund, the
banks will usually make such an agreement a precondition for debt relief.
Although the financial resources which the Fund provides are a welcome
contribution to the solution of the debtor's problems, the principal importance
of the Fund's involvement is in the conditionality which accompanies its
lending in the upper credit trenches, Supplementary Financing Facility, and
Extended Fund Facility. The Fund plays the vital role of assessing the
borrower's needs, developing a stabilization program in consultation with the
borrower that will re-establish the borrower's creditworthiness, and monitoring
the country's performance under the stabilization program.
Banks are ill-equipped to establish formal conditionality over sovereign
borrowing. They lack both legitimacy and expertise. In contrast, the IMF has
substantial expertise in designing and implementing stabilization programs
and, as an international organization, is well suited for establishing conditionality; however, its financial resources are limited. There would seem to be
substantial potential gains from closer cooperation between the IMF and
commercial banks, but there are also substantial difficulties in formalizing a
mode of cooperation.
The relationship between private banks and the IMF is complex. Before the
onset of a debt crisis, the borrower is likely to perceive bank lending as a
substitute for credit from the Fund. Indeed, sovereign borrowers would be
likely to oppose greater cooperation between the Fund and commercial banks
at this stage because it would limit their options. Although Fund credit is
cheaper in financial terms, the perceived social and political cost of submitting
to the Fund's conditionality are such that most countries continue to borrow
from commercial banks at higher rates so long as they can. (This provides
strong presumptive evidence that the conditionality imposed by the banks is
much weaker than that imposed by the Fund.) In most cases reliance on bank
financing is entirely appropriate, and in view of the Fund's limited lending
capacity, necessary; but, in the case of countries that experience debt crises, it
is clear - ex post - that recourse to the Fund was delayed unduly. By
continuing to underwrite policies that were inconsistent with long-term equilibrium, commercial banks have, in effect, exacerbated the adjustment problem. The larger the adjustment problem, the sharper the necessary shift in
policies and, consequently, the greater the strain placed on the social and
political structure of the borrowing country and on the international financial
system.
Such strains could be reduced if borrowers were induced to turn to the
Fund before their balance-of-payments problems reach crisis proportions.
Borrowers could be induced to turn to the Fund earlier if the Fund's conditionality were softened, but such a softening would make recourse to the Fund
less valuable in preventing and correcting debt servicing difficulties. Alternatively, commercial banks would be more likely to send borrowers to the Fund
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sooner if they perceived greater expected losses from a debt crisis, which would
be the case if foreign loans were marked to market [7].
With the onset of a debt crisis, the relationship between the Fund and the
commercial banks necessarily becomes more cooperative. The commercial
banks must rely on the Fund for information about the debtor's condition and
for the formulation of a realistic stabilization policy. The Fund, in turn, must
rely on the commercial banks to provide an appropriate amount of financing
during the stabilization program [8]. If commercial banks provide too much
financing, the borrower will find it unnecessary to meet the conditions established for drawing under the IMF facilities, with the result that little adjustment will take place. (This may have been the case with the IMF stabilization
programs for Great Britain, Mexico, and Italy in the mid-seventies.) If commercial banks provide too little financing or reduce their exposure, the
borrower may be forced to undertake much more painful contractions of
aggregate demand.
Although there is an informal flow of information between commercial
banks and the Fund, the flow is somewhat inhibited. On the part of the Fund,
there is a reluctance to disclose any information that is not approved by the
member government, lest an unauthorized disclosure jeopardize future flows of
information from the member country. Banks, on the other hand, are reluctant
to signal their intentions regarding future lending to the borrower, in part
because they are not certain that the IMF stabilization program will work and
wish to maintain their freedom to withdraw credit. In addition, they wish to
maintain competitive flexibility. A bank that correctly perceives the turning
point in a country's recovery program before its competitors may be able to
make substantial profits by offering financing when a country must pay higher
spreads, than later, when it is clear to all that the stabilization plan is working.
Although the absence of lending commitments from commercial banks
heightens the uncertainty in launching a stabilization program, it may also
have a salutary effect. The necessity of winning the confidence of the market
counterbalances the political pressures on the Fund to err on the side of
requiring too little conditionality. On the other hand, the market pressure to
show quick results may force a country to choose a suboptimal adjustment
path with consequent heavy costs in reduced growth, greater unemployment,
and heightened social and political tensions. The appropriateness and effectiveness of IMF stabilization programs are the subject of considerable controversy.
A better understanding of how they contribute to the adjustment process could
reduce uncertainties in the post renegotiation phase.
4. The impact of debt renegotiations on the value of bank loans
Although information is scant, it is often asserted that banks have not lost
money in renegotiating sovereign debt. It is argued that the present value of
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the schedule of payments when the loan agreement was signed is no greater
than the present value of the schedule of payments after the renegotiation
agreement. Even if this assertion is true, however, commercial banks undoubtedly suffer an economic loss in a debt crisis. The loss may be concealed
by the fact that, inasmuch as nations do not go out of business, and market
quotations are not available on foreign loans, balance sheet values are not
ordinarily adjusted to reflect increased risk following a debt crisis [9].
It is necessary to treat the schedule of debt service payments as a stream of
risky cash flows rather than a certain stream of payments. The present value of
the bank's claim on the borrower can be summarized as:
N

pv=

E(C,) -,]/D,,
t=1

where E(C) [10] is the expected value of the scheduled cash flows, C, in
period t; A, is the amount the bank would be willing to pay to be certain of the
cash flow in period t. Thus, the difference, E(C,)-A,, is the certainty
equivalent cash flow; D, is the risk-free discount factor - the future value in
period t of one dollar invested at the risk-free rate.
It is instructive to compare the value of the loan at three different points:
(1) when the original loan agreement was signed, (2) when the debt crisis
began, and (3) when the renegotiation agreement was signed. The present value
of the loan is likely to have been highest when the original loan agreement was
signed. (A comparison of the rate of return the bank would achieve if the
borrower met all scheduled debt service payments, with the rate of return on a
risk-free asset, would indicate the implicit default premium.) At the start of the
debt crisis, even the near-term debt service payments are in doubt and the
present value of the loan is likely to be at its lowest point. After the loan has
been successfully renegotiated, the present value of the loan will rise, but it is
likely to have a lower present value than when the original loan agreement was
signed.
The renegotiation will have two opposite effects on expectations of future
cash flows. First, the shift in government policies and the rescheduling of debt
service payments to correspond more closely to the borrower's anticipated cash
flows will increase the probability that the borrower will be able to meet the
scheduled debt service payments. This factor is offset to some extent, however,
by knowledge that the borrower has failed to honor past promises to make
payments. In comparison with the original evaluation, after the renegotiation
the expected values of cash flows are likely to be lower in comparison to
contractual values of debt service payments, and the certainty adjustment
factors are likely to be larger since the expected values are undoubtedly subject
to greater uncertainty. These differences are likely to be larger the longer the
grace period and the longer the extension of maturities, because distant cash
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flows are vulnerable to a greater number of unfavorable events than near-term
cash flows.

5. A proposal for valuing foreign loans at the market
A requirement that foreign bank loans be carried on the books at true
market value would tend to offset some of the adverse consequences of the
short-leash strategy. Such a change would cause a sharp reassessment of the
risks in foreign lending. Market spreads on most country loans over the past
several years indicate that, except during periods of unusual stress, banks
expect these loans to be virtually risk-free. In part this may reflect the fact that
under current procedures write-offs can be delayed more or less indefinitely
because there is always some chance that the debtor may be able to meet the
rescheduled payments. If these loans are valued as the market value of a
stream of risky payments, however, write-offs will occur as expectations
regarding repayment prospects change (and as certainty-adjustment factors
and the risk-free term structure change). Spreads will rise to reflect the
perceived risk that payments may not be made on schedule.
To the extent that past debt crises have been aggravated because banks have
underwritten policies in the debtor country that were inconsistent with external
equilibrium, debt crises are likely to be less severe. Countries will be forced to
change their policies earlier, whether in response to market pressures or an
IMF stabilization program.
In the event of a debt crisis, banks would be likely to adopt a different
negotiating position, because the value of each loan will reflect its repayment
prospects, and there would be no point in negotiating a repayment schedule
that the borrower is unlikely to be able to meet. Indeed, since interruptions in
debt servicing raise the risk of repudiation which would further depress market
values, the banks would have strong incentives to negotiate a schedule that
reflected the borrower's capacity to repay.
Market valuations also would tend to reduce excessive concentration of risk
exposure of individual banks to specific countries, especially if they were
accompanied by public disclosure of such exposure. It would also stimulate
innovations in financing development that would accommodate the need to
spread risks, such as the development of secondary markets in foreign loans or
an increase in bond financing or direct investment flows. The world-wide
allocation of resources also would be improved because banks would be
focusing on risk-adjusted rates of return.
In contrast, in the absence of innovations in bond financing, direct investment, or official lending, such a change would probably increase the cost and
reduce the volume of loans to foreign borrowers. In addition, major shocks to
confidence that cause abrupt declines in market values could affect the volume
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of new foreign lending as much as or perhaps even more than under a system
where balance sheets are revalued only when loans are charged off. A market
value system would help avoid crises but may not be optimal in a crisis-prone
world.
The main obstacle in implementing such a change is finding a source or
establishing a procedure for valuing international loans. If the valuation
procedure must involve administrative determinations, it is probably a hopeless task. Henry Wallich has examined the closely-related problem of determining a regulatory policy toward recognition of losses on international loans. He
concludes that it is very difficult to estimate the ultimate loss for an international loan because of uncertainties over the policies that the debtor will
pursue, the duration of the default, and prospects for the world economy [I1l.
The problem is further complicated by inevitable conflicts in judgment between regulatory authorities in different countries. Conflicts arise now regarding whether or when to classify loans to a given country as "loss", but they are
infrequent and apply only to loans of a given country in distress. Valuation
must be a continuing process, however, and it must cover all international
loans, which means that the possibility of obtaining international consensus is
nil.
What is needed are objective market valuations that would transcend
national boundaries and avoid the need for administrative determinations
(except for the determination to use market values). We have proposed
elsewhere to develop a secondary market in international loans for the purpose
of facilitating reductions in excessive concentrations of country risk exposure.
Such markets would serve the equally important purpose of providing valuation data.

6. An evaluation of other proposals for reform
Proposals for the reform of the renegotiation process have addressed the
information base, the initiation of the process, the objectives of the renegotiation, and the institutional arrangements. We shall consider each in turn.
Inadequate information may contribute to a debt crisis and undoubtedly
impedes a speedy resolution. Since a country's outstanding stock of indebtedness is an important element in an evaluation of its credit-worthiness, inadequate information gives rise to the risk of a debt crisis by miscalculation.
Moreover, before a realistic repayment schedule can be drawn up, it is
necessary to know the magnitude of the repayments that must be rescheduled.
The provision of this sort of information is an international public good. In the
absence of government assistance, the amount of information available is likely
to be suboptimal. Since no private entity could appropriate the benefits that
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accrue to users of such information, they will lack sufficient incentives to
produce it.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that on several occasions both creditors and
debtor governments have been surprised by the magnitude of a country's
external debt, and that renegotiations have been subjected to substantial delays
while information is amassed. Sudan reputedly sent out questionnaires to
determine how much it owed to banks, and Poland is reported to have hired an
international accounting firm to provide information regarding its debt servicing responsibilities. There have been substantial improvements in the information base over the past decade [12]. The creditor reporting system of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee and the debtor reporting system of the
World Bank have been expanded to cover a wider range of countries. Nevertheless, there are still substantial delays in reporting and important gaps in
information regarding debt to non-banks with original maturity of less than
one year and long-term debt that is not guaranteed by the government.
The situation with regard to bank claims on developing countries has
improved remarkably with the introduction of two reporting systems by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS quarterly survey of international bank claims and liabilities is not well-suited for prudential questions. It
is based on balance-of-payments data, and therefore presents information
classified by the domicile of the bank office, not the consolidated position of
the headquarters banks nor even of the banks headquartered in particular
countries. The BIS semi-annual survey of the maturity of international banklending is considerably more useful. It presents aggregated external positions
of banks located in the Group of Ten countries, Switzerland, Austria. Denmark, and Ireland; and of many of their affiliates domiciled in other countries.
Undisbursed external credit commitments are also tabulated for a smaller
group of reporting countries. As more members of the BIS collect exposure
data on a worldwide basis for banks headquartered in their countries, the
usefulness of the data should improve. But at present it is not possible to
identify the world-wide activities of banks headquartered outside the United
States and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the coverage of some affiliates in
offshore banking centers is incomplete and the data are not adjusted for
guarantees.
Proposals to improve the information base should be non-controversial
because better quality information on a more timely basis can make both
debtors and creditors better off. There remains, however, the awkward question of identifying which international organization should have the responsibility for integrating the existing sources of information and filling in the gaps
that result from differing institutional purposes. In addition, one should not
underestimate the difficulty in collecting comparable, meaningful data from
hundreds of institutions that have located in scores of political jurisdictions,
sometimes for the purpose of avoiding disclosure of banking data.
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On the other hand, the initiation of the renegotiation process is controversial. The developing countries have argued that the debtor country should be
able to request a reorganization of its external debt whenever "it believes it has
a debt problem or whenever it has a development problem of which debt is an
element" [13]. The developing countries would like to obtain a rescheduling
before a liquidity crisis occurs, both in order to prevent the interruption of
development efforts and sharp policy shifts, and in order to enhance their
bargaining position. Under the present system, in essence, a country can obtain
a rescheduling of its debt only by threatening to undertake a unilateral
rescheduling by letting arrears accumulate [14].
As we have noted, banks prefer that borrowers refinance when confronted
with a prospective debt problem. We have argued that failure to achieve a
refinancing is symptomatic of a dispute between a country and its creditors
over its policies. From this perspective, the debt crisis may be intepreted as a
mechanism for resolving a dispute over the borrower's policies. It follows that
the appropriate remedy for a country that wants to avoid a debt crisis is to
change its policies earlier and undertake a market refinancing. This leaves open
the more fundamental question of whether there might not be a way of
resolving such disputes that is less threatening to international relations and
the international financial system than the brinkmanship involved in a debt
crisis. One such remedy would be to have the borrower consult with the IMF
at an earlier stage. But, as noted above, there are substantial obstacles to
implementing such a change [15].
Any requirement that banks reschedule at the initiative of the borrower
would undoubtedly raise the cost of credit because banks would have to be
compensated for the opportunity cost in extending the loan involuntarily. If it
is possible to identify the countries most likely to demand a rescheduling, those
countries would bear most of the costs by paying higher spreads. To the extent
that it is not possible to make such an identification, the burden of higher
spreads would be borne by all countries.
There is also a dispute over the objectives of the renegotiation. The
developing countries assert that currently renegotiations focus on the objective
of maintaining the flow of debt service payments to the exclusion of development objectives. They insist that some minimum growth of per capita output
should be given equal priority with the resumption of debt service payments
[16].
Creditors argue that the best way to restore growth is to restore the
borrower's credit-worthiness as soon as possible. This dispute is parallel to the
dispute over IMF stabilization programs and at root its solution depends on
the optimal balance between financing and adjustment.
The basic problem of judging how much the borrower can afford to pay is
common to all work-out situations. In the case of a country, the judgment
requires complete information regarding foreign exchange receipts and ex-
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penditures. Inevitably there is much uncertainty over future flows and, often
because of data limitations, over current flows as well. Moreover, the flows
depend on government policies that operate with long and uncertain lags. In
view of the moral hazard that creditors face in dealing with a sovereign, there
is undoubtedly a tendency for creditors to demand more rapid repayment than
would seem warranted by projections of the country's foreign exchange flows.
They are constrained, however, by the knowledge that excessively harsh terms
can be counterproductive. An austerity program that leads to political chaos
will delay the country's financial rehabilitation and could raise the threat of
debt repudiation. In evaluating the burden of a stabilization program, creditors
also face a grave problem of moral hazard, since governments have some
capacity to influence the acceptability of austerity programs.
To some extent this dispute could be resolved by better research on the
trade-off between adjustment and financing. A conflict over terms, however, is
intrinsic to any restructuring. Borrowers, because of the constraints on their
economic sovereignty, will feel that terms are too harsh. Lenders, because of
their concern over moral hazard, will feel that repayment is too slow. Moreover, they want to make the terms somewhat onerous in order to discourage
additional renegotiations. Any attempt to require that all renegotiations set
repayment schedules that permit the borrower to grow at some specified rate
per capita are likely to raise the cost of borrowing substantially because it
would be very difficult to anticipate the costs of such a commitment.
There has also been controversy over the institutional arrangements for debt
renegotiations. To some extent this is another facet of the dispute over
objectives. Concern over institutional arrangements also extends to procedures. The developing countries would prefer a multilateral forum in which
their total debt problems could be viewed in the context of their development
problems [17]. Private creditors, in contrast, prefer to deal with private debt
problems in isolation, in an ad hoe manner.
The problem with the current set of arrangements is that they are cumbersome to deploy and do not enable debtors and creditors to achieve the benefits
of consolidation of the sovereign's debt. In essence, the debtor is forced to
conduct three sets of negotiations simultaneously - with official creditors, with
commercial banks, and with the IMF. This is inevitably awkward because in
order for the final package to make sense the three agreements will have to be
made consistent. Moreover, progress is made difficult by the concern of each
of the participants over equal treatment. Neither the IMF nor official creditors
wish to be viewed as bailing out the commercial banks, and the commercial
banks do not wish to take on the burdens of official institutions. These are
legitimate interests that need to be protected, but they could be equally well
protected in one negotiation that recognizes differences among classes of
creditors, as is traditional in domestic bankruptcy proceedings.
There may also be advantages in identifying some institution as the locus of
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debt renegotiations. The Fund would be a logical choice because of its usual
involvement in stabilization policies. The development of institutional expertise in handling debt crises could facilitate a quicker resolution of such
problems. These institutional changes are attractive because they hold the
promise of making both borrowers and lenders better off.

7. Conclusion
As the number of debt crises mounts, the probability increases that the
delays and brinkmanship inherent in existing arrangements will overload the
system. If a very large debtor is involved, failure to reach a timely agreement
could cause a sharp revaluation of the riskiness of lending to developing
countries on the part of banks, bank depositors, shareholders, and regulators.
At a minimum, such a reaction would lead to a substantial increase in the
spreads on loans to developing countries and a consequent increase in the
burden of servicing external debt. There is a risk, however, that the market
response would be much stronger and more far-ranging. Implicit risk premiums might rise so high that developing countries would be unable to
roll-over their indebtedness at any spread and many countries who would have
had no difficulty in servicing their debts under favorable market conditions
would be forced to interrupt debt service payments. Moreover, the calculation
of the costs and benefits of debt repudiation would shift sharply in favor of
repudiation in such an environment. Under such circumstances, confidence
would be undermined in banks that have large exposures to developing
countries. And because such banks have significant positions in the interbank
markets, confidence might also be undermined in banks that are suspected of
having large claims on the exposed banks [18]. The consequences of such a
reaction are so grave that the development of less stressful procedures for
resolving debt crises is an urgent priority for public policy.
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Notes
[1] Group of Thirty, How Bankers See World Financial Markets 5 (1982).
[2] Unless a foreign borrower has provided extra-territorial security, all foreign lending not
denominated in the borrower's own currency is subject to transfer risk. Even if the borrowed funds
were productively employed so that they increase the local currency profits of a private borrower
or the local currency tax revenues of a government borrower, poor productivity or mismanagement
in other sectors of the economy can reduce net earnings of foreign exchange and cause an
interruption in debt service payments.
[3] Of course, this is not the only motivation for short loan maturities. Trade finance, for
example, is traditionally short term because each transaction is considered to be self-liquidating
over a short interval. Nevertheless, even the value of trade credits can be jeopardized by a
country's loss of credit-worthiness.
[4] The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1982, at 34.
[5] The deficit may have increased for any number of reasons. It may be the consequence of an
excessive expansion of aggregate demand, a shortfall of exports due to an interruption of domestic
supplies, a decline in foreign demand for exports, or a surge in import prices. Moreover, it is
possible that the deficit may not have increased, but instead the willingness of creditors to finance
a given deficit may have declined due to a shift in expectations regarding the country's prospects.
Whatever the cause, whether it be due to factors exogenous or endogenous to the country, the
deficit is not sustainable in the sense that it requires more financing than creditors are willing to
provide on an ongoing basis.
(6] These costs of reschedulings are becoming increasingly worrisome to banks. The report of a
recent opinion survey by the Group of Thirty notes, supra note 1, at iv, that: "More than half the
respondents think the indirect costs of rescheduling could become a 'significant' concern in the
future."
[7] See Section 5 infra for an analysis of the implications of adjusting balance sheets to reflect
true market values of claims on troubled debtors.
[8] Recently, in developing stabilization programs for Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, the IMF
has insisted on explicit coordination. For example, the Managing Director of the IMF is reported
to have insisted that commercial banks roll over $20 billion of Mexican credits maturing between
August 1982 and the end of 1984 and also provide an additional $5 billion in new loans
(Farnsworth, A Dramatic Change at the IMF, New York Times, Jan. 9, 1983, at IF and 10F).
[9] See Wriston, BankingAgainstDisaster,New York Times, September 14, 1982, at A27, for a
strong defense of the proposition that countries do not go bankrupt. Under the system of foreign
bond financing employed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, bond holders sustained
capital losses on their books when increasing prospects for default depressed the market price.
Partly for this reason settlements between bond holder committees and debtor governments
typically involved some forgiveness. Sachs, LDC Debt in the 1980's: Risk and Reforms, in Crises in
the Economic and Financial Structure 220 (1982), notes that: "Defaults were typically settled... on
terms which rarely preserved more than a small fraction of the capital value of the original asset."
The bond holders had strong incentives to negotiate a repayment schedule that was a realistic
reflection of the debtor's capacity to repay. They had already sustained a capital loss based on the
market's expectations of the country's repayment prospects, and negotiation of an unrealistic
repayment schedule was likely to increase it. Bond holders were also in a weaker bargaining
position vis-Ik-vis debtors in default than are commercial banks. Both banks and bond holders
could deny debtors access to future credut but banks, in addition, can bar debtors from
participation in the international payments system.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol5/iss2/4

J. Guttentag, R. Herring / Debt crisis: The renegotiationprocess
[10] The cash flow may be decomposed into two components:
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where s is the contractual spread on the loan, i, is LIBOR at time t, and P, is the principal
repayment scheduled at time t. The first term is subject to uncertainty over whether the borrower
will meet his interest and principal payments and over the level of LIBOR. The second term is
subject to uncertainty over the level of LIBOR only. The bank must pay for the cost of funds even
if the borrower does not make the interest payment.
[I I] Speech by Henry Wallich given at the 1982 Euromarkets Conference (February 9, 1982).
[12] For a recent assessment of the data base, see Davis, Financing Third World Debt (1980).
[13] Annex to a Note by UNCTAD secretariat, Selected Issues Relating to the Establishment
of Common Norms in Future Debt Reorganizations, October 31, 1977.
[14] This was made quite explicit in the case of Rumania. The authorites reputedly refused to
make any further payments to their bank creditors until they agreed to a rescheduling (see
Farnsworth, Rumania in Talks with LM.F. New York Times, March 8, 1982, at DI.)
[15] See text at section 3.6 supra.
[16] UNCTAD, October 1979.
[17] UNCTAD, The External Indebtedness of Developing Countries (1977).
[18] Bankers are keenly aware of this risk. The recent opinion survey by the Group of Thirty,
supra note 1, at 4, concludes that: "Large numbers and amounts of reschedulings were seen as the
main threats to the international banking system."
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